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WORK: INTERPRETING THE EQUAL TERMS PROVISION OF THE
RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS
ACT (RLUIPA)
Andrew Cleves*

I. INTRODUCTION
In warm, sunny Broward County, Florida, a dispute arose between a
church and local government.1 The church, Primera Iglesia Baustista
Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. (Primera), purchased a house to renovate
into a church.2 The county, which zoned the area for agricultural use,
sought ―to protect, preserve and enhance the rural character and lifestyle
of existing low density areas and agricultural uses.‖3 The two sides
could not agree on how to use the land. The dispute lasted nearly a
decade, and each side spent countless hours and dollars on litigation
over the equal terms provision of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).4
Halfway across the country, in Indianapolis, a similar conflict arose
when a small Baptist congregation leased a building for church
services.5 Indianapolis, however, forbade religious use without a
variance, having created a zone to serve as a ―buffer[] between
residential . . . and entirely commercial or industrial districts.‖6
However, the city permitted many different land uses without a
variance, including auditoriums and assemblies.7 The Indianapolis
parties also litigated under RLUIPA‘s equal terms provision.8
Congress enacted RLUIPA in 2000, in response to a perceived need
* Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank all his friends and family for their support during the writing of this article and law school. He
would also like to thank Kate Ward and Jacob Dean for their guidance.
1. Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295 (11th
Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 1301.
3. Id. at 1300.
4. Primera purchased the property in December 1997 and the Eleventh Circuit ruled in June
2006. Id. at 1300.
5. Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 2007).
6. Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
7. Id. at 614–615.
8. Id. at 614.
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to protect the religious liberty of land users, prisoners, and other
institutionalized persons.9 This Comment addresses RLUIPA‘s land use
provision, which covers two main areas of government action. The first
land use section prohibits governments from imposing laws that
substantially burden religious exercise.10 The second land use provision
addresses laws that discriminate against or exclude religious assemblies
or institutions.11 The equal terms provision, in the latter section,
provides that ―[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on
less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.‖12
Since RLUIPA‘s enactment, courts have struggled with interpreting
the Act‘s different provisions. The majority of the litigation has
centered on the substantial burden section. Recently, however,
interpreting the equal terms provision has confounded the courts.
Specifically, the courts have failed to reach uniform resolution on three
main issues: (1) what qualifies as a religious assembly or institution,13
(2) whether religious assemblies or institutions should be compared to
similarly situated assemblies or institutions,14 and (3) what is the
appropriate level of scrutiny.15
Three circuits have addressed these issues, reaching different
conclusions.
The Eleventh Circuit construed ―assemblies or
institutions‖ in accordance with the terms‘ natural meaning and
determined laws demonstrating unequal treatment must survive strict
scrutiny.16 In contrast, the Third Circuit asserted the equal terms
provision operates on a strict liability standard and has concluded all
plaintiffs must identify a similarly situated secular comparator with

9. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No.
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006)); 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01
(2000).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (a) (2006).
11. Id. § 2000cc (b).
12. Id. § 2000cc (b)(1).
13. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2004);
River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 2010).
14. See, e.g., Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230; Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 370.
15. See, e.g., Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230–1232; Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 370–371.
16. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230–1232.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/5

2

Cleves: EQUAL TERMS: WHAT DOES IT MEAN AND HOW DOES IT WORK: INTERPRETING

2011]

COMMENT—EQUAL TERMS AND RLUIPA

211

respect to the ordinance‘s regulatory purpose.17 Finally, the Seventh
Circuit held that all equal terms provision plaintiffs must present
similarly situated assemblies or institutions with respect to ―accepted
zoning criteria.‖18 The Seventh Circuit also determined the assembly
definition should more closely consider the assembly‘s effect on the
municipality and incorporated the Third Circuit‘s strict liability
standard.19
This circuit split has created unequal burdens on municipalities and
religious assemblies across the country. For example, the Indianapolis
church, in the Seventh Circuit‘s jurisdiction, must present a similarly
situated assembly or institution as a prerequisite to bringing a successful
claim. On the other hand, any challenged Broward County, Florida
laws, in the Eleventh Circuit‘s jurisdiction, must serve a compelling
government interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that goal or
interest. This unequal treatment has placed an inordinate burden on
churches and governments in their efforts to comply with the law.
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit‘s accepted zoning
criteria test, with minor changes, offers the best method to analyze the
equal terms provision. Part II of the Comment describes the
circumstances surrounding RLUIPA‘s enactment and places the equal
terms provision in context. Part III illustrates the different courts‘ equal
terms provision analysis. In Part IV, this Comment critiques the
circuits‘ assembly definition, similarly situated requirement, and
scrutiny standard. Finally, Part V concludes the Supreme Court should
issue a guiding opinion that implements a modified version of the
Seventh Circuit‘s accepted zoning criteria standard.
II. HOW RLUIPA BECAME LAW
Many contentious events surrounded RLUIPA‘s passage. These
events illuminate the motivation for the equal terms provision and place
it in statutory context.

17. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 268–269 (3rd
Cir. 2007).
18. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 371.
19. Id.
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A. The Free Exercise Struggle
Congress‘s enactment of RLUIPA was the latest installment of a
decade-long struggle between the judiciary and Congress over
preserving religious liberty in America. The Supreme Court‘s decision
in Employment Division v. Smith initiated this struggle.20 In Smith, the
government denied a Native American unemployment benefits after his
employer fired him for ingesting peyote as part of a religious practice.21
The Court held that laws of general, neutral applicability do not need a
compelling government interest when applied to religious practices.22
Therefore, the Court found no free exercise violation.23 This ruling
overturned the Sherbert v. Verner balancing test, which the courts
employed for years and on which federal and state governments relied.24
The Sherbert test required a compelling government interest for any law
that substantially burdened religious exercise notwithstanding whether
that law was neutrally applied.25 The resulting change adopted in Smith
had the following consequences: (1) laws that had only an incidental
affect on religious liberty were permissible,26 and consequently, (2)
neutral and generally applicable laws infringing on religious liberties
only needed to survive rational basis review.27
The Supreme Court applied the Smith standard in Church of the
Lukumi Babalue Aye, Inc. v. City of Hileah.28 There, a church claimed
city ordinances that prevented the church from practicing animal
sacrifice violated the Free Exercise Clause.29 The church had leased
land, announced a plan to establish a house of worship, and had begun

20. Emp‘t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
21. Id. at 874.
22. Id. at 886.
23. Id.
24. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Sherbert Court held that South Carolina could
not constitutionally withhold unemployment benefits to an individual who was unemployed because she
refused to work on her day of Sabbath. Id. at 410.
25. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
26. Id. at 878.
27. Id. at 878–885.
28. Church of the Lukumi Babalue Aye, Inc. v. City of Hileah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
29. Id. at 527, 528.
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to obtain the appropriate permits.30 The city subsequently passed a
series of ordinances that ultimately banned only animal sacrifices, a
religious practice of the church.31 The Lukumi Court invalidated the
ordinances, holding they were religious gerrymandering, not neutral and
generally applicable.32
Despite decisions like Lukumi, Congress disagreed with Smith and
quickly responded by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).33 RFRA expressly rejected Smith and intended to restore the
Sherbert compelling interest test.34 Congress concluded that (1)
religiously ―neutral‖ laws might still burden religious exercise, (2)
governments need compelling justification to substantially burden
religion, (3) Smith essentially eliminated the requirement that
governments justify burdens imposed by neutral laws, and (4) the
compelling interest test was functional.35
The Supreme Court responded in-kind and struck down RFRA just
four years later in City of Boerne v. Flores.36 The Boerne Court
concluded that RFRA ―far exceed[s] any pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct‖ under the post-Smith Free Exercise Clause.37
The Court struggled with RFRA‘s lack of a factual basis, finding a
distinct absence of proof of hostility, burdens, or widespread patterns of
discrimination.38 Therefore, ―[t]he stringent test RFRA demands of state
laws reflects a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means
adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved.‖39 In Boerne, the courts
denied Congress‘s attempt to protect religious liberty.

30. Id. at 525, 526.
31. Id. at 526–528.
32. Id. at 535, 540.
33. The Supreme Court handed down the Employment Division v. Smith decision in 1990 and
Congress passed RFRA in 1993.
34. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified
as amendment at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (b)(1) (2006).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (a)(2)–(5).
36. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
37. Id. at 534.
38. Id. at 530–531.
39. Id. at 533.
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B. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act: Building a
Foundation.
Only a few weeks after Boerne, the House of Representatives held a
series of hearings entitled Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v.
Flores.40 Cognizant of the Boerne reasoning, Congress strove to collect
information and gather support for legislation, which Congress deemed
The subsequent
necessary to preserve religious freedom.41
congressional hearings featured testimony from constitutional law
scholars, religious leaders, and practicing attorneys.42
RLUIPA‘s hearing record compiled ―massive evidence‖ that local
governments all throughout the country had violated individuals‘
religious exercise rights.43 Senators Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy44
concluded governments often facially discriminated against churches in
zoning regulations and though land use regulation‘s ―highly
individualized discretionary process.‖45 The record demonstrated
zoning codes often excluded churches but permitted ―theaters, meeting
halls, and other places where large groups of people assemble for
secular purposes.‖46 The studies found that discrimination occurred
most often through ―vague and universally applicable‖ zoning reasons
such as ―not consistent with the city‘s land use plan.‖47 In one instance,
Los Angeles prohibited fifty elderly Jews from meeting for prayer in a

40. Sarah Keeton Campbell, Note, Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 58 DUKE L.J.
1071, 1079 (2010) (citing Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2 (1997); Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores
(Part II): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998); Protecting Religious
Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part III): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1998)).
41. See id.; 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000).
42. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774–S7777 (2000) (citing testimony and reports from Professor
Douglas Laycock, Professor Jay Bybee, Thomas C Berg, and the Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs).
43. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000).
44. Senators Hatch and Kennedy worked on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and cosponsored the Senate RLUIPA bill. Senator Hatch was the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. 146 CONG. REC. S7774–S7775 (2000).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000).
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six-square mile neighborhood.48
The city expressly said the
neighborhood did not have room for a worship place and it did not want
to create a precedent for one.49 However, the city permitted other
assemblies to meet, including schools and recreational users.50
Though most of the information was anecdotal, Congress also sought
empirical information, and considered a study conducted by Brigham
Young University (BYU).51 The study showed that small religious
groups were ―vastly overrepresented in reported church zoning cases.‖ 52
It highlighted, for example, that ―Jews account for only 2% of the
population‖ but were involved in 20% of all litigation involving church
locations.53 Based on all the evidence, the senators concluded that ―[i]t
is impossible to make separate findings about every jurisdiction, or to
legislate in a way that reaches only those jurisdictions that are guilty.‖ 54
C. RLUIPA: The Act
Given the discrimination described above, Congress drafted the
following provisions as RLUIPA‘s land use section:
(a) Substantial burdens
(1) General rule: No government shall impose or implement a land
use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or
institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of
the burden on that person, assembly, or institution—
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest . . . .
(b) Discrimination and exclusion
48. Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 779
(1999). Senators Hatch and Kennedy cited this law review article in their joint statement before the
Senate. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000).
49. Laycock, supra note 49, at 779.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 770–771 (citing a Brigham Young University study).
52. Id. at 771.
53. Id.
54. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000).
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(1) Equal terms: No government shall impose or implement a land
use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or
institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or
institution.
(2) Nondiscrimination: No government shall impose or implement a
land use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or
institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination.
(3) Exclusions and limits: No government shall impose or implement
a land use regulation that—
(A) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction;
or
(B) unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or
structures within a jurisdiction.55

The substantial burden section also includes jurisdictional limits in
(a)(2), which indicates the provision includes (1) any federal assistance
programs, (2) anything affecting commerce, and (3) any government
land use regulations.56
D. The Equal Terms Provision in Context
Many scholars compare the substantial burden section and equal
terms provision57 even though the two are ―operatively independent.‖58
Legislative history aids the interpretion of the provisions by
demonstrating the emphasis and limitations drafters placed on each
section.
Especially instructive are the joint statements of Senators Hatch and
Kennedy, and a coalition letter.59 The statements briefly explain the
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2) (2006).
57. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 41, at 1083–1085; Anthony Lazzaro Minervini, Comment,
Freedom From Religion: RLUIPA, Religious Freedom, and Representative Democracy on Trial, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 571, 583 (2010).
58. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003).
59. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7774–S7777 (2000). The referenced coalition letter is from the
Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, written by the general counsel of the Baptist Joint
Committee on Public Affairs. The letter is one of several included in the Congressional Record along
with the joint statements by Senators Hatch and Kennedy. The Congressional Record also includes a
letter from the U.S. Department of Justice—Office of Legislative Affairs, and a letter from the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. Id.
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different sections‘ scrutiny standards. The senators argued that
widespread discrimination and individual assessments necessitated the
heightened scrutiny level of the substantial burden section.60 For the
equal terms provision, the senators indicated it ―enforce[s] the Free
Exercise Clause rule against laws that burden religion and are not
neutral and generally applicable.‖61 The coalition letter addressed the
two sections in a similar fashion. It justified the substantial burden
section by highlighting the following: (1) the section does not grant
religious assemblies immunity, (2) the claim will fail if a claimant
cannot demonstrate a substantial burden, and (3) the government has the
opportunity to rebut any substantial burden claim.62 After this lengthy
substantial burden justification, the letter only mentions the equal terms
provision in passing.63 This legislative history explains the difference
between the provisions‘ scrutiny standards and suggests that Congress
was much more concerned with the substantial burden section.
Finally, the legislative history offers some sense of RLUIPA‘s
limitations. Senators Hatch and Kennedy admitted that the ―Act does
not provide religious institutions with immunity from land use
regulation.‖64 They further established that churches still have to apply
for permits when available absent discrimination or unfair delay. 65
E. RLUIPA’s Impact and Burden on Local Governments
Critics have since discovered flaws in the legislative process and
congressional justification for RLUIPA. For instance, while religious
landowners testified about discrimination, no homeowners testified, and
Congress denied local government organizations the opportunity to
speak.66 Additionally, recent scholarship has questioned the BYU study
60. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (2000).
61. Id. at S7776.
62. Id. at S7777.
63. The author discussed the equal terms provision in less than half a sentence. Id.
64. Id. at S7776.
65. Id.
66. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, ASS‘N OF AM. L. SCHS.,
http://www.aals/profdev/constitutional/hamilton.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2010); see also Patricia E.
Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal
Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local Government, 40 URB. LAW. 195, 207 (2008); Marci Hamilton,
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for using outdated statistics and for analyzing only zoning decisions the
plaintiffs appealed.67 For example, a New Haven, Connecticut study,
which is more representative than the BYU study, found no evidence of
bias.68 The study‘s author concluded that ―local governments remain
capable of impartially evaluating‖ interests in land use disputes.69
Just as Congress justified legislation with many anecdotal
discrimination cases, other anecdotal evidence suggests that some
municipalities have suffered substantial burdens under RLUIPA. In
Boulder, Colorado, officials have long sought to protect the county‘s
―spectacular beauty‖ from Denver‘s encroaching suburbs.70 However, a
church, which had already expanded from thirty-six families to 2,200
people on a 55-acre plot, wanted to double its facility size. 71 The parties
went to court, and if Boulder lost, it would have had to pay both its own
legal bills and the church‘s.72 Therefore, although Congress sought to
alleviate burdens on one population through RLUIPA, it created a new
set of burdens on a different population.
RLUIPA was, in sum, the product of a decade-long struggle between
the Executive and Judicial Branches over religious liberty regulations.
Congress enacted RLUIPA due to a perceived need to protect the
religious liberty of land users. However, municipalities and courts have
suffered their own burdens in light of RLUIPA.

Struggling with Churches as Neighbors: Land Use Conflicts between Religious Institutions and Those
Who Reside Nearby, FINDLAW (Jan. 17, 2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20020117.html.
67. Stephen Clowney, Comment, An Empirical Look At Churches In The Zoning Process, 116
YALE L.J. 859, 865–866, 868 (2007).
68. Id. at 861, 865. Mr. Clowney argued New Haven, Connecticut was an excellent test subject
for the following reasons: (1) the laws and demographics of the city: the medium-sized university town
was full of educated elites ―who are often accused of being ‗hostile to religion and to churches,‖ and
Connecticut laws made no special exceptions for religious land uses; (2) the heterogeneous mix of
religious groups in New Haven ―roughly mirror[ed] the distribution of religious groups at a national
level‖; and (3) the New Haven government maintained specific records on all zoning appeal applications
filed since 1954. Id. at 861–862.
69. Id. at 868.
70. Diana B. Henriques, As Exemptions Grow, Religion Outweighs Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
8, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/business/08religious.html?pagewanted=6&_r=2.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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III. CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF RLUIPA‘S EQUAL TERMS
PROVISION
Despite the apparent simple and straightforward construction of the
equal terms provision, courts have struggled with its interpretation and
application. Specifically, the circuits have conflicting views on three
points. First, the courts have divergent understandings on the definition
and context of assembly or institution. Second, the circuits are split over
a similarly situated requirement. Finally, the circuits have disagreed on
the appropriate level of scrutiny.
A. The Eleventh Circuit
In Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, the Eleventh Circuit‘s
first and most prominent equal terms provision decision, the court
addressed an ordinance prohibiting churches and synagogues in seven of
eight zoning districts.73 The ordinance permitted churches in the
residential district only after obtaining a conditional use permit.74 Two
Jewish congregations wanted a synagogue within walking distance of
their homes—located in the town‘s business district—because Orthodox
Judaism forbids using transportation on the Sabbath.75 Surfside claimed
the ordinance was designed ―to invigorate the business district‖ and
create a strong tax base.76 According to Surfside, allowing churches and
synagogues would erode the tax base and cause economic hardship.77
The Midrash court ruled that the ordinance violated RLUIPA‘s equal
terms provision.78
The Midrash court first analyzed the statutory construction of the
substantial burden and nondiscrimination provisions, and concluded the
provisions were ―operatively independent of one another.‖79 The court
noted the substantial burden jurisdictional nexus did not apply to the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 1220, 1221.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1219.
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004).
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equal terms provision because ―§ (a)(2), by its terms, applies to
‗subsection‘ (a).‖80
The court then rejected the district court‘s similarly situated
requirement on the basis that RLUIPA provisions ―require a direct and
narrow focus.‖81 Instead, the court considered the congregation‘s claim
in light of the category of ―assemblies or institutions.‖82 Therefore,
before analyzing a potential statutory violation, the court needed to
determine whether an entity qualified as an assembly or institution. 83
The court looked to assemblies‘ ―ordinary or natural meaning‖ for a
definition, which was ―a company of persons collected together in one
place usually and usually for some common purpose (as deliberation and
legislation, worship, or social entertainment).‖84 Because Surfside
treated churches and synagogues differently from private clubs and
lodges—both organizations within the assemblies or institution
definition—the court concluded Surfside violated the equal terms
provision.85 In reaching this conclusion, the Midrash court asserted the
equal terms provision codified free exercise jurisprudence.86 Therefore,
the court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether the law
was neutral and generally applicable.87
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently addressed the equal terms
provision in Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v.
Broward County.88 There, a Baptist congregation sued based on the
county‘s agricultural zone requirements.89 The Primera court ruled that
a plaintiff must present a similarly situated ―nonreligious comparator‖
for any as-applied equal terms challenge, and the church had failed to
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1230.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (some internal formatting omitted). The Midrash court got its definitions of assembly and
institution from Webster‘s Dictionary and Black‘s Law Dictionary. Id.
85. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 2004).
86. Id. at 1232.
87. Id.
88. 450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). This Comment discussed the Primera facts in Part I. A
Baptist church filed an equal terms provision lawsuit after the County prevented the church from
relocating in an agricultural use zone. Id. at 1300–1302.
89. Id. at 1299–1300.
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meet this burden.90 Therefore, the court upheld the Broward County
ordinance excluding churches from the agricultural zone.91
B. The Third Circuit
In Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals largely rejected the Eleventh
Circuit‘s approach.92 Lighthouse was ―a Christian church that [sought]
to minister the poor and disadvantaged in downtown Long Branch.‖93
Lighthouse purchased property in Long Branch‘s ―Central Commercial
District,‖ which permitted assembly halls and municipal buildings but
excluded churches.94 Long Branch consistently denied Lighthouse‘s
applications, even though Lighthouse wanted to use the property for
activities like a soup kitchen and job skills training program.95
In the midst of litigation, Long Branch changed its zoning ordinance
and created a redevelopment plan to improve the city‘s revenue, job
markets, and overall economic opportunities.96 Under the new plan, the
city allowed studios and clubs, but expressly prohibited churches,
schools, and government buildings in the commercial district.97 Long
Branch also denied Lighthouse under the new ordinance, claiming a
church would prevent the block from being used as ―a high end
entertainment and recreation area.‖98
The Lighthouse court first compared the equal terms and substantial
burden sections, distinguishing the two based on the statute‘s plain text
and legislative history.99 The court noted that § 2(a)(1), not § (2)(b)(1),
provided the substantial burden requirement, and the court further found

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1311–1313.
Id. at 1314.
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3rd Cir. 2007).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 259 (3rd Cir.

2007).
99. Id. at 262.
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no legislative history connecting the provisions.100
Addressing the similarly situated component, the court held plaintiffs
must show a similarly situated ―secular comparator‖ with respect to the
challenged ordinance‘s ―regulatory purpose.‖101 The court considered
the free exercise analysis, which compares secular and religious conduct
that ―has a similar impact on the regulation‘s aims.‖102 In requiring a
similarly situated comparator, the Third Circuit rejected the Midrash
assembly categorization.103
The court also rejected the Eleventh Circuit‘s scrutiny standard,
holding the ―[e]qual [t]erms provision operates on a strict liability
standard; strict scrutiny does not come into play.‖ 104 Under this
standard, if a land use regulation treats secular and religious assemblies
unequally, the court automatically invalidates the regulation. 105 The
court found the strict liability standard in the statute‘s plain text, arguing
that the exclusion of strict scrutiny in the equal terms provision, coupled
with its inclusion in the substantial burden section, demonstrated
congressional intent.106
After evaluating these factors, the Lighthouse court determined the
original ordinance, but not the redevelopment plan, violated the equal
terms provision.107 The original ordinance failed because the court
rejected the assertion that churches would cause greater harm to the
regulatory purposes than an unspecified assembly hall.108
The
redevelopment plan, however, survived scrutiny because ―churches are
not similarly situated to the other allowed assemblies with respect to‖
the plan‘s economic development goals.109

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
2007).
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 262–263.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 268.
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 269 (3rd Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270, 272.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 270.
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C. The Seventh Circuit
In River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Hazel Crest,110 the Seventh
Circuit issued the most recent equal terms provision ruling, which
significantly shifted the circuit split balance. The Seventh Circuit noted
that its jurisdiction had previously111 ―followed the Eleventh Circuit‘s
interpretation.‖112 However, in Hazel Crest, the circuit adopted a test
similar to the Third Circuit approach.
The regulation challenged in Hazel Crest concerned a business
district zone that permitted a wide variety of commercial and retail uses,
including recreational buildings and community centers, but excluded
churches.113 The town had suffered many years of economic decline
and the city hoped to revitalize the area as a commercial center.114 A
church, River of Life, challenged the regulation. River of Life had only
sixty-seven members, operated out of a warehouse, and purchased a
building for relocation.115 After the church filed an equal terms
provision claim, Hazel Crest amended its ordinance to exclude some
secular assemblies, including meeting halls, schools, and community
centers.116 The court upheld the town‘s zoning ordinance,117 reaching its
conclusion largely through analyzing the other circuits‘ interpretations
of equal terms provision.
The Seventh Circuit vehemently disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit‘s
assembly definition and strict scrutiny analysis. 118 The court criticized
the Eleventh Circuit‘s assembly analysis as reading the statute too
literally by including ―any ‗assembly,‘‖ and argued the approach ―would

110. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2010).
111. The previous cases include the following: Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of
Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003); Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975 (7th Cir.
2006); and Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2007).
112. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 377 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 368, 377.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 368.
116. Id. at 364, 368.
117. Id. at 374.
118. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369–370 (7th Cir.
2010).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

15

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 5

224

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

give religious land uses favored treatment.‖119 The Hazel Crest court
asserted the broad assembly definition would encompass most secular
land uses, such as parks and soup kitchens, because ―visitors to each
have a ‗common purpose‘ in visiting.‖120 The assembly definition
should instead, according to the court, focus on the assemblies‘ effects
―on the municipality and its residents.‖121 The Seventh Circuit
subsequently argued the Eleventh Circuit‘s strict scrutiny requirement
was unnecessary for two reasons: (1) there was no textual basis for the
claim and (2) ―religious discrimination is expressly prohibited elsewhere
in the statute.‖122
The Hazel Crest court then argued the Third Circuit‘s regulatory
purpose test gave local authorities too much subjective leeway. 123 The
circuit therefore shifted the focus ―from regulatory purpose to accepted
zoning criteria.‖124 Accepted zoning criteria would prevent local
authorities from manipulating their zoning regulations and would
instead allow federal judges to apply more objective standards.125
The Hazel Crest court then analyzed potential accepted zoning
criteria before upholding Hazel Crest‘s amended ordinance.126 The
Seventh Circuit postulated that separate zoning areas, including
residential and municipal, would ―insure a better and more economical
use of municipal services.‖127 Therefore, Hazel Crest was not unique to
exclude churches and non-commercial assemblies from a certain
zone.128 The Seventh Circuit ultimately held that treating ―religious and
secular land uses . . . the same from the standpoint of an accepted zoning
criteria, such as ‗commercial district,‘ or ‗residential district,‘ . . . is
enough to rebut‖ an equal terms provision claim.129
In sum, the circuits that have addressed the equal terms provision
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 369.
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id. at 370–371.
Id.
River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 371–374.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 373.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/5

16

Cleves: EQUAL TERMS: WHAT DOES IT MEAN AND HOW DOES IT WORK: INTERPRETING

2011]

COMMENT—EQUAL TERMS AND RLUIPA

225

lawsuits differ on three primary issues. First, the circuits split on the
appropriate assembly definition. The Eleventh Circuit defined assembly
within its ―ordinary or natural meaning[],‖130 while the Third and
Seventh Circuits criticized this definition as too broad.131 Second, the
circuits split over the similarly situated requirement. The Third and
Seventh Circuits applied a similarly situated requirement in relation to
the ordinance‘s regulatory purpose and accepted zoning criteria
respectively.132 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the similarly situated
requirement all together.133 Third, the circuits split on the appropriate
level of scrutiny, with the Eleventh Circuit applying a strict scrutiny
analysis134 while the Third and Seventh Circuits appled strict liability.135
IV. DISCUSSION: EVALUATING THE COURTS‘ INTERPRETATION OF THE
EQUAL TERMS PROVISION
The Seventh Circuit offers the best equal terms provision test. With
some modifications and additions, all courts should implement the Hazel
Crest standard. This subpart first discusses the assembly definition,
which the courts should define in an economic context, contrary to the
circuits‘ current approaches. Next, this subpart considers the similarly
situated comparator element, for which the Seventh Circuit, with its
accepted zoning criteria standard, presented the best analysis. Finally,
this subpart analyzes the potential scrutiny standards and concludes the
Third Circuit appropriately chose a strict liability standard.
A. Assembly Definition: Why an Economic Context?
The courts should define assembly in terms of the assembly‘s
economic impact instead of the ordinary or natural meaning.136 The

130. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2004).
131. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 268 (3rd Cir.
2007); River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 2010).
132. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 264; Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 371.
133. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230.
134. Id. at 1232.
135. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269; Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 371.
136. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1232.
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Eleventh Circuit alone defined assembly in its ordinary and natural
meaning—a company of people usually collected in one place for a
common purpose.137 Instead of offering an alternative definition, the
Third and Seventh Circuits merely argued this interpretation was too
broad.138 Despite not offering a new definition, the Third and Seventh
Circuits correctly assessed the Eleventh Circuit‘s approach. The
Seventh Circuit offered better reasoning, explaining that the definition
was too broad because it would encompass secular land uses that have
different effects on the municipality.139 The courts could solve the
broad definition issue and concerns over municipality effect by defining
assembly in an economic context.
Defining assembly in an economic context would solve several
problems. First, it would cover the impact on a municipality.
Furthermore, defining assembly in an economic context would provide a
clear definition to an otherwise ambiguous provision, and it would offer
a balanced approach to help diffuse the burdens on churches and
municipalities. Finally, using the economic context approach would
shift some of the zoning power back to municipalities. Courts could
apply this economic assembly definition in several different manners.
For example, the courts could define an assembly as a group of people
collected for a common purpose that generates a certain amount or
percentage of tax revenue.
Scholars and officials at all levels have long considered cultivating
economic growth on a local scale a priority. Leading urban planning
experts have asserted that cities are the ―economic engine of society.‖ 140
President Clinton recognized this when he enacted legislation that
offered tax incentives to spur economic growth in certain urban areas.141
Other scholars have concluded that ―commerce and industry . . . [are]
137. Id.
138. See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268; River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest,
611 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2010).
139. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 370.
140. Steven J. Eagle, Kelo, Directed Growth, and Municipal Industrial Policy, 17 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 63, 96 (2009) (citing scholars Jane Jacobs and Professor Richard Schragger).
141. Jennifer Forbes, Note, Using Economic Development Programs as Tools for Urban
Revitalization: A Comparison of Empowerment Zones and New Markets Tax Credits, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 177, 183 (discussing the EZ/EC tax incentives enacted after the Los Angeles riots as part of a
domestic policy shift using market-based incentives to revitalizes urban areas).
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necessary and desirable elements of the community.‖ 142
In many of the equal terms provision lawsuits, municipalities had
defined zones based on economic need, illustrating the importance and
impact of economics on local governments. The Hazel Crest court
concluded the city ―created a commercial district that excludes churches
along with community centers‖ because none of these assemblies, ―like
churches . . . generate significant taxable revenue or offer shopping
opportunities.‖143 Surfside, the town in Midrash, argued it designed the
ordinance to create a strong tax base and invigorate the business
district.144 In Lighthouse, Long Branch‘s amended redevelopment plan
strove to improve the city‘s revenue and job opportunities.145 Defining
assembly in economic terms would allow cities to meet these economic
needs.
Defining assembly in an economic context would also alleviate some
of the burden municipalities have suffered while still recognizing
congressional intent. Despite efforts to compromise, municipalities
have faced litigation, suffered large legal fees, and have had their efforts
to exercise the police power through zoning impaired.146 Furthermore,
the evidence relied upon by Congress to support RLUIPA has recently
been scrutinized. For instance, neither homeowners nor municipalities
testified at the congressional hearings,147 and subsequent studies have
rebuffed the empirical evidence supporting RLUIPA.148 Though these
factors do not invalidate the anecdotal discrimination cases, they suggest
the equal terms provision burdens municipalities more than legislators
intended. Senators Hatch and Kennedy explicitly said RLUIPA leaves

142. Harry B. Madsen, Noncumulative Zoning in Illinois, 37 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 105, 113 (1960).
143. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 373.
144. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1221–1222 (11th Cir. 2004).
145. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 258 (3rd Cir.
2007).
146. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 67, at 253–255 (highlighting several examples of drawn out
legal battles, including a dispute involving a Jewish congregation that wanted to add an additional
20,000-square feet to a Victorian home in a historic district that included a 5,000-square foot home for
the rabbi); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing how the dispute between the church
and government in Primera lasted from 1997–2006).
147. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 67, at 207.
148. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 67, at 257; Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local
Land Use Decisions: Lessons From RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 717, 754 (2008).
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all policy choices to the states.149 Defining assembly in economic terms
would permit municipalities to regulate based on economic need where
they see fit. Just as RLUIPA was a compromise between the judiciary
and legislature,150 this assembly definition would serve as a compromise
between churches and municipalities.
Permitting municipalities to zone based on economic need would also
return some local authority to zoning, an area local governments
The judiciary treated zoning laws
traditionally controlled.151
deferentially under the original zoning conception and gave
municipalities great control over land use planning. 152 However, as
scholars have indicated, municipalities under modern zoning often take
a wait-and-see approach, which has led to a highly discretionary and
individualized assessment-zoning method.153
Through RLUIPA
Congress sought to prevent this individualized assessment. Adopting an
economic assembly definition would protect churches by establishing
explicit criteria but also return some zoning control to municipalities.
For these reasons, the courts should define assembly within an
economic context for the benefit of both municipalities and religious
assemblies.
B. Similarly Situated Comparator and Accepted Zoning Criteria
Under this Comment‘s proposed equal terms provision analysis,
courts should require plaintiffs to present similarly situated assemblies
with respect to the accepted zoning criteria the city implements. The
Third and Seventh Circuits use the similarly situated element. The
Third Circuit evaluated the similarly situated assembly in light of the
municipality‘s regulatory purpose. The Seventh Circuit‘s consideration
149. 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (2000).
150. Congress demonstrated the first signs of compromise when it responded to Boerne by
attempting to compile ―massive evidence of discrimination.‖ Furthermore, before Congress passed
RLUIPA, the Senate Judiciary Committee drafted the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999.
However, the bill never made it out of the committee due in part to the Act‘s wide scope. Salkin &
Lavine, supra note 67, at 205–206.
151. Ostrow, supra note 149, at 719.
152. Ostrow, supra note 149, at 721; see also Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Reality Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (establishing judicial deference).
153. Ostrow, supra note 149, at 734, 735.
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of accepted zoning criteria, and not the regulatory purpose, offered an
objective analysis point designed to protect churches and municipalities.
This subpart first addresses the similarly situated component and then
applies it to the accepted zoning criteria.
1. Similarly Situated Comparator
Analyzing equal terms provision claims based on a similarly situated
assembly is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and congressional
intent. Furthermore, all three circuits have, at least arguably, adopted
the similarly situated requirement.
The Eleventh Circuit first expressed contradictory reasoning by using
a similary situated standard in Midrash before adopting that standard in
Primera. After the Midrash court ruled the equal terms provision
needed a more direct and narrow focus than a similarly situated
standard, the court asserted the equal terms provision codified the SmithLukumi free exercise precedent.154 This precedent established that a
―zoning law is not neutral or generally applicable if it treats similarly
situated secular and religious assemblies differently.‖155 The Primera
court subsequently applied a similarly situated standard to as applied
equal terms provision challenges.156 Therefore, at best, the Eleventh
Circuit adopted the similarly situated requirement. At worst, the
Eleventh Circuit contradicted itself.
Regardless of the Eleventh Circuit‘s determination, the Third and
Seventh Circuits‘ similarly situated requirement is consistent with
congressional intent and free exercise precedent. RLUIPA‘s authors
explicitly designed the equal terms provision to ―enforce the Free
Exercise Clause rule‖ against laws that are not neutral and generally
applicable.157 As the Midrash court described, Free Exercise Clause
precedent analyzes similarly situated comparators to determine any
constitutional violations.158 The circuits subsequently created different
154. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
155. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added).
156. Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1311
(11th Cir. 2006).
157. 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (2000).
158. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1232.
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standards based on this Free Exercise Clause influence. While the
Eleventh Circuit adopted the strict scrutiny standard, the Third Circuit
read the free exercise implications to require a similarly situated
standard.159
The similarly situated requirement is the most appropriate analysis, as
essentially all three circuits adopted it, and it is consistent with
precedent and congressional intent. Having established why plaintiffs
must present a similarly situated comparator, this subpart will now
consider the basis for other institutions to be considered similarly
situated to the religious assemblies.
2. Accepted Zoning Criteria
The Seventh Circuit‘s accepted zoning criteria analysis offers the best
test. It requires equal terms provision plaintiffs to present similarly
situated comparators with respect to the ordinance‘s accepted zoning
criteria.160 This objective standard will protect municipal interests,
religious liberty, and satisfy congressional concerns about
discrimination.
The Third Circuit‘s regulatory purpose test, on the other hand, leaves
the door open for individualized assessment and discrimination. The
Seventh Circuit summarized the problem well:
[T]he use of ‗regulatory purpose‘ as a guide to interpretation invites
speculation concerning the reason behind the exclusion of churches;
invites self-serving testimony by zoning officials and hired expert
witnesses; facilitates zoning classifications thinly disguised as neutral but
actually systematically unfavorable to churches . . . .161

This discretionary freedom directly contradicts what Senators Hatch and
Kennedy sought to accomplish. The Lighthouse case itself illustrates
the problem. The Third Circuit, in upholding the ordinance, overlooked
Long Branch‘s subjective intent when it changed the zoning ordinance,
with the new purpose to improve the city‘s economic market, in the

159. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3rd Cir.
2007).
160. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 2010).
161. Id.
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midst of litigation.162
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit‘s accepted zoning criteria protects
against individualized assessment and subjective intent by providing
objective standards. The court‘s Hazel Crest decision offered some
examples of objective, accepted zoning criteria, including maintaining
parking space, traffic control, and generating municipal revenue.163
Establishing objective criteria would put all parties on notice. Churches
would know where they could locate, and municipalities would know
the accepted regulation criteria. Furthermore, as the Hazel Crest court
noted, federal judges could easily apply the criteria to resolve
lawsuits.164
In Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, the Tenth
Circuit explained why objective standards do not create individualized
assessment.165 The case concerned an ordinance that mandated certain
variance denials, which forced the zoning board to deny a church‘s
request to operate a day care.166 The court held the denial was not an
individualized assessment because the ordinance application was based
on objective criteria and the board had no discretion.167 This same logic
applies to any zoning laws once the municipality integrates its accepted
zoning criteria into the ordinances.
Though accepted zoning criteria protects against individualized
assessments, the judiciary must vigilantly apply the test. In both
Lighthouse and Hazel Crest, the courts misapplied the standard. In each
case, the municipality changed the zoning ordinance or plan once the
religious assembly applied for a permit. In Lighthouse, the city created
the redevelopment plan to improve the city‘s economy and added
schools and government buildings to the prohibition list.168 The Hazel
Crest town amended the ordinance to exclude more secular assemblies,

162. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 258.
163. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 373.
164. Id. at 371.
165. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006).
166. Id. at 654.
167. Id.
168. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 256, 258 (3rd
Cir. 2007).
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including meeting halls, schools, and community centers.169 These
changes, after the religious assembly instituted a zoning request, are the
same type of discrimination Congress sought to protect against.
Therefore, courts cannot permit these post-request plan alterations for
the accepted zoning criteria standard to truly uphold free exercise
precedent and legislative intent.
Though some disapprove of the accepted zoning criteria because it
adds to the statute‘s plain text,170 practicality concerns also make it the
best test. As Judge Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit noted, ―[A]lthough
Congress may have intended to prescribe a standard more openended . . . its application, as a practical matter requires . . . some
limitations to be provided by the judiciary.‖ 171 The practicality relates
to the burden municipalities and religious assemblies have suffered
through an open-ended standard and the judicial-congressional struggle
over religious liberty protection laws. After the Supreme Court‘s denial
of legislative attempts to combat discrimination, adding these
requirements to the plain text satisfies the judiciary and addresses the
congressional concerns.
Applying the accepted zoning criteria standard to previous free
exercise and equal terms provision cases would lead to a similar
outcome. The standard covers the Lukumi religious gerrymandering
concerns by forcing municipalities to adopt accepted criteria that apply
across the board. Applied to equal terms provision cases—such as the
dispute involving the Indianapolis Baptist church—religious
organizations would prevail because they are similarly situated to
assembly halls and auditoriums, which are permitted in these zones.172
The Boulder ordinance should also survive, because maintaining an
agricultural zone could be an accepted zoning criterion.173 Finally, the
169. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 368.
170. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2004);
Campbell, supra note 41, at 1105 (―The lower courts‘ approaches to interpreting the equal terms
provision seriously distort Congress‘s intent and weaken RLUIPA‘s protections for religious liberty as a
consequence. Courts should avoid the pitfalls of these interpretations by adopting a textual
interpretation of RLUIPA‘s equal terms provision.‖).
171. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 374 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
172. Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 2007); see also
infra Part I (describing Digrugilliers, 506 F.3d 612).
173. Henriques, supra note 71 (illustrating that the city is not religiously gerrymandering to
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ordinance at issue in Midrash would still fail because it allowed
similarly situated private clubs and lodges with respect to the accepted
zoning criterion of creating a strong tax base.174
For these reasons, courts should evaluate all equal terms provision
claims based on similarly situated comparators with respect to accepted
zoning criteria.
C. Scrutiny: The Lack of a Need for a Strict Scrutiny Standard
The appropriate scrutiny level is the final point to address. A strict
scrutiny standard is unnecessary for several reasons. First, Congress
included a strict scrutiny analysis in RLUIPA‘s substantial burden
section, a completely separate section from the equal terms provision.
Second, other sections of RLUIPA have built-in standards that address
the strict scrutiny concerns. Finally, by the time the accepted zoning
criteria analysis applies strict scrutiny, the ordinance would have already
undergone a searching scrutiny. Therefore, courts should implement a
strict liability standard for the equal terms provision.
RLUIPA‘s substantial burden section—not the equal terms
provision—offers governments the opportunity to justify their
regulations through a strict scrutiny analysis. The equal terms provision
merely states ―no government shall impose . . . a land use
regulation . . . .‖175 Courts and commentators have concluded the two
provisions are ―operatively independent,‖ a telling indicator that the
equal terms provision does not utilize a strict scrutiny analysis. 176 The
Lighthouse case used the operative independence inference to conclude
that ―[s]ince Congress evidently knew how to require a showing of a
substantial burden, it must have intended not to do so in the [e]qual
exclude the school because the policy has long been in place).
174. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1221–1222 (11th Cir. 2004).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006).
176. See, e.g., Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir.
2003); Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1229; see also Campbell, supra note 41, at 1100 (―The substantial burden
provision explicitly provides that land-use regulations that substantially burden religious exercise should
be evaluated under a compelling interest test. The equal terms provision, appearing in the very next
section of RLUIPA, lacks any similar requirement.‖); Minervini, supra note 58, at 583 (―It is important
to note at the outset that the Discrimination and Exclusion provisions of the RLUIPA operate
independently of the Substantial Burden provision . . . .‖).
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[t]erms provision.‖177
The legislative history justifying these two sections reemphasizes
the Lighthouse conclusion. Senators Hatch and Kennedy spent a
significant amount of time justifying the strict scrutiny standard of the
substantial burden section while only mentioning that the equal terms
provision enforced the Free Exercise Clause.178 The justification efforts
also signify the importance and emphasis drafters placed on the two
provisions.179
The Hazel Crest court offered some insightful contextual comments
with respect to the weight drafters placed on the equal terms provision.
Specifically, the majority considered that the ―equal terms provision is
not the only or even the most important protection against religious
discrimination by zoning authorities.‖180 The opinion further described
the many other RLUIPA land use provisions that protect religious
liberty, including the substantial burden section, the nondiscrimination
provision, and the exclusion and limits provision.181 Furthermore, as
one scholar noted, reading a strict scrutiny analysis into the equal terms
provision would essentially duplicate the substantial burden section.182
All of these factors demonstrate that the equal terms provision does
not require a strict scrutiny analysis. However, one must also consider
that under the proposed equal terms provision test, the ordinance will
have already undergone the searching scrutiny the Eleventh Circuit
sought to enact through strict scrutiny. The Eleventh Circuit, with a
broad assembly definition, permits many equal terms provision claims to
proceed before analyzing them under strict scrutiny. The accepted
zoning criteria test allows fewer qualifying plaintiffs, but the test

177. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 263 (3rd Cir.
2007) (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
178. 146 CONG. REC. S7775–S7776 (2000).
179. In addition to the Senators‘ statements justifying the two provisions, as noted in Part IID, the
general counsel for the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion wrote a letter included in the
legislative history. The author justified the substantial burden section by highlighting the following: (1)
the section does not grant religious assemblies immunity, (2) if a claimant cannot demonstrate a
substantial burden the claim will fail, and (3) the government has the opportunity to rebut any
substantial burden claim. 146 CONG. REC. S7777 (2000).
180. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 374 (7th Cir. 2010).
181. Id.
182. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 67, at 247.
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immediately invalidates the ordinance if it meets the initial criteria.
Therefore, as the Lighthouse court concluded, the ―[e]qual [t]erms
provision operates on a strict liability standard; strict scrutiny does not
come into play.‖183
V. CONCLUSION
The best equal terms provision analysis requires plaintiffs to present
similarly situated comparators with respect to the ordinance‘s accepted
zoning criteria, and applies strict liability once the plaintiff has met that
standard. This analysis solves several problems. First, the analysis
acknowledges the struggle between Congress and the judiciary over
religious liberty jurisprudence by advocating a compromise that
addresses each side‘s concerns. Second, the compromise alleviates the
burdens felt by both municipalities and religious land users. For
example, Boulder, Colorado, could justify its regulations without fear of
spending thousands of dollars on litigation, and the Indianapolis Baptist
church could locate in its requested area. The test offers clear criteria
for all parties—religious land users, municipalities, and the courts.
Finally, the test addresses free exercise and congressional discrimination
concerns. The objective accepted zoning criteria would uncover any
municipal religious gerrymandering attempts and strike down laws that
are not neutral and generally applicable.
The Supreme Court needs to issue a guiding opinion to this respect.
Then, all parties will have a clear standard, and a Florida evangelical
church and a Chicago synagogue will be treated the same. The Supreme
Court must explicitly address situations where municipalities change
their zoning ordinances after a religious land user initiates a zoning
request. So long as the Supreme Court addresses this issue or, in the
alternative, the lower courts adopt the test and self-regulate, courts will
have an effective method by which to analyze equal terms provision
challenges.

183. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269.
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